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The Dred Scott Case - Revisited
WALLACE MENDELSON*
Roger B. Taney's name is no longer "hooted down the pages
of history" as Senator Sumner decreed it should be.' Charles
Evans Hughes has recognized that Taney was "a great Chief Jus-
tice"2 and competent legal scholars have amply glossed that
text.3 But the passing of the years has not dealt so impartially
with Dred Scott's Case.4 It still bears the stigma of the abolition-
ist cause which hides the reality that the most criticized exercise
of the power of judicial supremacy did no more than give con-
stitutional sanction to a position held long and persistently by
most voters in the United States. If the judges were wrong so
were "the people"!
The Missouri Compromise, that is, the principle of congres-
sional interference with slavery in the territories as a political
possibility for the solution of the slavery controversy, had been
abandoned years before the Dred Scott Case held it unconstitu-
tional. Nor is there evidence that, with or without the Dred
Scott decision, anything other than popular sovereignty, the
principle of congressional non-interference with slavery in the
territories, was politically feasible at any time after 1848. Indeed
congressional intervention was so -generally recognized as im-
practical that Congress on two occasions immediately before the
Dred Scott decision expressly conferred upon the courts juris-
diction over the slavery problem in the territories. The ultimate
resort to war between the states proves not that the judiciary
foreciosed political settlement of the slavery issue, but rather,
if anything, that some issues cut too deeply to be solved either
judicially or legislatively. The real misfortune of the Dred Scott
Case is that, duly distorted, it served as a powerful weapon for
the abolitionists-always a small extremist minority. The court's
fault, if it can be called that, was its acceptance of the buck that
Congress passed to it and its failure to anticipate the use which
its efforts could be made to serve.
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee.
1. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1865) 1012.
2. Charles Evans Hughes, Roger Brooke Taney (1931) 17 A.B.A.J. 785.
3. See, for example, Swisher, Roger B. Taney (1935); Frankfurter, The
Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite (1937); Palmer, Marshall
and Taney, Statesmen of the Law (1939).
4, Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U. S. 393, 15 LEd. 691 (1857).
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Adequate perspective requires a tearing of the web of history
at 1848 after the acquisition by the United States of the Mexican
and Oregon Territories. The new American empire raised again
the question of the extension of slavery. The obvious answer,
the one sponsored by President Polk in a special message to Con-
gress, was the extension of the old Missouri Compromise of 1820
which had served for the settlement of the same issue in the
Louisiana Territory. But for the extremists on both sides that
would not suffice. Congress was deadlocked between the Wilmots
and the Calhouns. For some, two years American settlers in the
new territory were without law and government because Con-
gress could not decide whether they should be with or without
slaves.5
Finally in the great Compromise of 1850 the principle of
congressional interference was rejected in favor of popular sov-
ereignty for the new territories. The election of Franklin Pierce,
an ardent anti-abolitionist, to the presidency in 1852 ratified the
new settlement. For Pierce and the convention which nominated
him unequivocally endorsed the Compromise of 1850. General
Scott, the principal opposition candidate, remained silent on that
crucial issue, while his party's strongest leaders had opposed the
settlement in 1850 and denied renomination to Millard Fillmore,
who as President had signed the measures in which it was em-
bodied. As Professor Hicks puts it "The issue before the electo-
rate was thus primarily Franklin Pierce and the Compromise, or
General Scott and uncertainty.""
The Missouri Compromise was not only not extended in
1850, indeed it was completely abandoned by repeal in the Kau-
sas-Nebraska Act of 1854. Thereafter congressional non-interfer-
ence was !he rule for the old Louisiana Territory as well as the
new territories. President Pierce, who as presidential nomin:
had indorsed popular sovereignty, sponsored the Kansas-Nebr,.
ka Bill as an administration measure, and in his last message to
Congress on December 2, 1856, indorsed the Dred Scott decision
in advance. After reviewing the history of the slavery issue, he
denounced the Missouri Compromise as conducive to sectional
strife, and attributed the victory of James Buchanan in the presi-
5. 1 Morrison and Commanger, The Growth of the American Republic
(1942) 495.
6. Hicks, A Short History of American Democracy (1943) 322. It is true




dential election of the preceding month to the determination of
the people to have an end of that difficulty.
Clearly Buchanan's victory was a ratification of popular sov-
ereignty and the Kansas-Nebraska Act.7 His platform had held
that "non-interference by Congress with slavery in State or Ter-
ritory" was "the only sound and safe solution of the slavery ques-
tion." His Republican adversary John C. Fremont had taken the
opposite position that Congress could and should prohibit slavery
in the territories.
In his famous inaugural address of March, 1857, Buchanan
referred to the matter of slavery in the territories in the follow-
ing terms "it is a judicial question, which legitimately belongs
to the Supreme Court of the United States before whom it is now
pending, and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled.
* . .The whole Territorial question being thus settled upon the
principal of popular sovereignty-a principle as ancient as free
government itself-everything of a practical nature has been
decided." s
Clearly the reference was to the Dred Scott Case then pend-
ing in the Supreme Court; clearly the treatment of slavery in
the territories as a judicial question must have accorded with
the views of most of Buchanan's contemporaries-else it would
hardly have been used on such an occasion; clearly on the eve of
the Dred Scott decision judicial determination of the slavery is-
sue in the territories was not generally considered incompatible
with "popular sovereignty."
Buchanan's usage and understanding of "popular sovereign-
ty" and the role of the judiciary in the slavery controversy clearly
accorded with the actions of Congress. The Compromise of 1850
and the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 both expressly adopt the
policy of congressional non-interference; Douglas, the champion
of popular sovereignty, had pushed both through Congress; both
contain clauses expressly referring questions of slave titles to
the local courts with appeal to the Supreme Court. Two years
7. Millard Fillmore, the Know Nothing candidate, also ran on a platform
advocating popular sovereignty.
8. These remarks are famous in connection with evidence now available
which indicates that Buchanan had advance notice ofwhat the Dred Scott
decision was to be. On this aspect of the matter, see Swisher, op. cit. supra
note 3, at c. 24. Advance notice or not, the thoughts expressed in that public
utterance make It quite obvious that on the eve of the Dred Scott decision
there was nothing unusual in the proposition that the constitutionality of
legislative interference with slavery in the territories was a judicial question.
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after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and before the
Dred Scott decision Douglas declared in Congress "My opinion
* . . has been well known in the Senate for years .... I told
them it was a judicial question .... My answer then was and
now is, that if the Constitution carries slavery there [into the
territories] let it go . . . but, if the Constitution does not carry
it there, no power but the people can carry it there .... I stated
I would not discuss this legal question, for by the bill we referred
it to the courts."" In 1860 Senator Judah P. Benjamin speaking
in Congress of the Kansas-Nebraska Act said similarly: "Morn-
ing after morning we met for the purpose of coming to some
understanding upon that very point (slavery in the territories);
and it was finally understood by all, agreed to by all, made the
.)asis of compromise by all the supporters of that bill, that the
Territories should be organized with a delegation by Congress
of all the power of Congress in the Territories, and that the ex-
tent of the power of Congress should be determined by the
Courts."' 0 Speaking of the same bill at the time of its passage
Senator Brown of Mississippi declared "It leaves the question
[of slavery in the territories] where I am willing it should be
left-to the ultimate decision of the courts."'"
It is significant that the Dred Scott issue was first presented
to Taney's court early in 1851 in the case of Strader v. Graham2
-and by it referred back, as is fitting in a democracy, when the
people have not yet clearly indicated their wishes, to the people
for an answer.13
9. Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. (1856) appendix, p. 797. The refer-
ence of the slavery problem to the courts was incorporated into the 'Compro-
mise of 1850 (whence it was copied in the Kansas-Nebraska Act) upon the
motion of J. P. Hall of New Hampshire-an abolitionist. Section 9 of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act provided for territorial courts and writs in the same
manner as from the federal circuit courts "except that in all cases involving
title to slaves, the said writs of error, or appeals shall be allowed and de-
cided by the said Supreme Court without regard to the value of the matter,
property or title in controversy. . . ." and that a writ of error or appeal
should be allowed to the Supreme Court "upon any writ of habeas corpus
involving the question of personal freedom. . . ." Section 14 provided that
the Missouri Compromise "is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being
the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any ter-
ritory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof
perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own
way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States. ..
10. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. (1860) 1966.
11. Quoted in Hockett, Political and Social Growth of the American
People (1940) 682.
12. 51 T1. S. 82, 13 L.Ed. 337 (1851).
13. The Strader case may be distinguished from the Dred Scott Case on
the ground that in the former the negro based his claim to freedom on the
ground that he had temporarily resided in a free state; Scott's claim was
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This then is the background of the Dred Scott Case. The
people had spoken directly at the polls and indirectly through
their representatives in Congress and the White House. They had
consistently rejected congressional interference and referred the
issue of slavery in the territories to the judiciary as unequivocally
and decisively as it is possible for a democratic majority to do.
When in 1856 Dred Scott first came before the Supreme
Court, Taney and most of his assocates still preferred to follow
the Strader precedent. Indeed a decision to that effect was writ-
ten and agreed upon by a majority of the bench.14 But the presi-
dential aspirations of Mr. Justice McLean (spokesman for the
abolitionists) would not have it so. McLean forced the question
of the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise into the Dred
Scott decision.15 Thus it was that Taney and his court gave con-
stitutional sanction to the views of a majority of contemporary
voters as expressed in the impasse of 1848-50, the Compromise
of 1850, the election of 1852, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854
and the election of 1856 (to say nothing of the intervening con-
gressional elections).
The Dred Scott decision was a sincere effort to lay at rest in
accordance with the expressed wishes of the people a disturbing
and dangerous controversy.16 But the abolitionists would accept
based inter alia on his temporary residence in the Louisiana territory and
so would come clearly within the spirit of the provision of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act referring questions of slave titles to the judiciary. While it
Is true that Scott's case did not arrive in the Supreme Court by way of the
jurisdictional route provided in either the Compromise of 1850 or the Kan-
sas-Nebraslka Act, it can hardly be denied that the Scott controversy was
exactly the type which Congress on two occasions invited the court to settle.
The repeatedly consistent stand which the people took after the first tenta-
tive step in the Compromise of 1850 explains the court's acceptance of the
invitation in 1857 and its refusal in 1851.
14. For this aspect of the case see Swisher, op. cit. supra note 3, at c. 24.
15. Ibid. See also 2 C. & M. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization
(1927) 18-19.
16. There is no reason to believe that Taney ever changed the views he
expressed in the Gruber case: "A hard necessity, indeed, compels us to en-
dure the evil of slavery for a time. It was imposed upon us by another na-
tion, while we were yet in a state of colonial vassalage. It cannot be easily,
or suqdenly removed. Yet while it continues it is a blot on our national
character, and every real lover of freedom confidently hopes that it will be
effectually, though it must be gradually wiped away; and earnestly looks
for the means, by which this necessary object may be best attained." Cited
in Swisher, op. cit. supra note 3, at 98. The similarity of these views and
those of Lincoln is striking. Taney's entire judicial career had been dedi-
cated to the proposition that the courts should not interfere with or hinder
the orderly settlement of political problems by the political branches of
government. See, for example, his opinions in The License Cases, 46 U. S.
504, 12 LEd. 256 (1847); The Passenger Cases, 48 U. S. 518, 579, 12 L.Ed. 801,
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the court's determination no more than that of the people. And
Taney's opinion, distorted for their needs, became a powerful
weapon for the abolitionist's cause.
It remains now to test the charge that in holding the Mis-
souri Compromise unconstitutional Taney's court blocked the
possibility of a political settlement which might have averted
the Civil War. The evidence goes the other way.
Stephen Douglas had sponsored the Kansas-Nebraska Act in
Congress. In a race for the United States Senate in Illinois in
1858 he stoutly defended the Dred Scott decision against Abra-
ham Lincoln, who opposed both the act and the decision. No
voters ever had the full implications of any issue more capably
presented to them than the people of Illinois in the Lincoln-
Douglas debates. Popular sovereignty and the Dred Scott deci-
sion were voted up and Lincoln was voted down-in a northern
constituency.
At Edwardsville, Lincoln had charged: "Familiarize your-
selves with the chains of bondage and prepare your limbs to wear
them. Accustomed to trample on the rights of others, you have
lost the genius of your own independence and become the fit
subjects of the first cunning tyrant who rises among you. And
let me tell you, that all these things are prepared for you by the
teaching of history, if the elections shall promise that the next
Dred Scott decision and all future decisions will be quietly ac-
quiesed in by the people."
Lincoln took the position that popular sovereignty could not
exist under the Dred Scott decision-the governmental powers
of the organized territories being derivative from Congress could
be no greater than those of Congress. Hence under Taney's de-
cision the territories, like Congress, had no alternative but to
accept slavery. At Freeport, attempting to place Douglas in a
dilemma, he asked the fateful question: "Can the people of a
United States territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of
any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits
prior to the formation of a state constitution?"
Douglas' answer was devastating: "It matters not what way
the Supreme Court may hereafter decide as to the abstract ques-
826 (1852); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U. S. 519, 10 L.Ed. 274 (1839); The
Charles River Bridge Co. Case, 36 U. S. 420, 9 L.Ed. 773 (1837); Luther v.
Borden, 48 U. S 1, 12 LEd. 581 (1848); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Bel-
mont Bridge Co., 54 U. S. 518, 579, 14 L.Ed. 249, 275 (1848),
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tion whether slavery may or may not go into a territory under
the Constitution, the people have the lawful means to introduce
it or exclude it as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot
exist a day or an hour anywhere, unless it is supported by local
police regulations . . . ." If a territorial legislature fail to enact
protecting measures (black codes), slavery would be effectively
excluded. The Dred Scott Case then had denied Congress nothing
real-notwithstanding the claims of the abolitionists. For Con-
gress could always invalidate any territorial enactment includ-
ing, for example, black codes.
Douglas' "Freeport Doctrine" secured his seat in the Senate,
made Lincoln's criticism of the Supreme Court gratuitous, and
gave the lie to the abolitionists. By the same token Douglas alien-
ated the Southern Democrats, split the Democratic party, and lost
thereby the presidency in 1860. Douglas convinced the voters of
Illinois as well as the Southern Democrats that Dred Scott plus
popular sovereignty did not play into the hands of the South.
That Douglas was correct had been amply demonstrated a few
months after the Dred Scott Case by the rejection in Congress
of the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution of Kansas. Lincoln's
question cost him a seat in the Senate, but by dividing the Dem-
ocratic party won him the presidency two years later.
In the presidential campaign of 1860 Lincoln and Douglas
maintained the positions they had taken in their famous debates
in Illinois. Breckinridge, the nominee of the Southern wing of
the Democratic party endorsed the Dred Scott Case warmly, but
rejecting Douglas' popular sovereignty, demanded positive con-
gressional action to protect slavery in the territories. This was
the South's answer to the Freeport Doctrine. Lincoln received
1,866,452 votes, as against a combined total of 2,226,738 for Doug-
las and Breckinridge.17 Lincoln's party obtained only a minority
in each house of Congress. A majority still stood with Taney!
A few weeks later on the eve of Ft. Sumter Senator Critten-
den-the successor to Henry Clay's seat in the Senate as fate
would have it-proposed a settlement which would have written
an extended Missouri Compromise into the Constitution. He
could not even get it through a Senate committee! That approach
to the slavery issue had not been politically feasible since the
17. John Bell of Tennessee ran on a platform recognizing "no political
principle other than the Constitution of the country, the union of the states,
and the enforcement of the laws." He received 588,879 votes.
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impasse of 1848-50. The Supreme Court had blocked no political-
ly workable approach to the slavery problem.
When at last the exclusion of slavery from the territories
became a political possibility, that is, after the secession of the
Southern states, Congress found no bar in the Dred Scott Case.1"
Constitutional power followed political power and was sufficient
for its needs.
18. Congress overrode (reversed) the Dred Scott decision by statute on
June 19, 1862, ending slavery in the territories. 12 Stats. 432.
